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Abstract 
 
Communications from constituents strongly shape the representation politicians provide. 
However, if politicians hear less from some constituents than others, this unequal communication 
may lead to unequal representation. In this paper I present a field experiment demonstrating that 
constituents are less likely to communicate to representatives not of their race. The experiment 
exploited electoral rules in Maryland, where several multi-member districts have both black and 
white representatives. I provided 8,829 residents of such districts an opportunity to communicate 
to one of their actual representatives, whose race I randomized. Both blacks and whites were 
markedly less likely to communicate to their representatives not of their race. These results 
imply that politicians receive racially distorted communication, hearing disproportionately 
infrequently from constituents unlike them. The fact that most racial minorities have white 
representatives may thus help explain both minorities’ less frequent communication to their 
representatives and the diminished substantive representation minorities typically receive. 
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 The communication politicians receive from their constituents strongly shapes the 
representation they provide. Representatives typically attempt to act in accordance with their 
constituents’ wishes, although in their natural state they often know surprisingly little about what 
their constituents prefer (Miller and Stokes 1963; Butler and Nickerson 2011; Broockman and 
Skovron 2013). As interest groups have long appreciated (Kollman 1998) and field experiments 
have accordingly confirmed (Bergan 2009; Bergan and Cole 2013), politicians thus crucially rely 
on constituent communication as they make policy decisions (see also Kingdon 1989; Miler 
2010, ch. 5; Congressional Management Foundation 2011). “The constituency that a 
representative reacts to is the constituency that he or she sees” (Fenno 1977, p. 883), and 
“Representative[s know their] constituents mostly from dealing with people who do write letters, 
who will attend meetings…” (Miller and Stokes 1963, p. 54). 
However, politicians do not hear equally often from all their constituents; rather, racial 
minorities in the United States are significantly less likely to communicate to their political 
representatives than are whites (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, p. 233). In the 2008 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study, for example, 33% of whites reported that someone in 
their household had contacted their House members’ office in the last year compared to only 
17% of blacks, 18% of Hispanics, and 15% of Asians.1 Because who politicians hear from 
significantly affects who they represent, these sizeable racial gaps have important consequences 
for political equality. However, despite much progress in understanding why Americans 
participate in politics and shrinking racial gaps in voter turnout (e.g., Aldrich 1993; Brady, 
Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Gerber and Green 2000), we have yet to understand why racial 
minorities are so disproportionately unlikely to contact their elected representatives. 
 In this article I present results from a large-scale field experiment demonstrating that 
these racial gaps in constituent communication can be explained in part by a phenomenon 
                                                
1 Weighted results. Unweighted estimates are similar. Author’s analysis, Ansolabehere (2008). 
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whereby individuals are less likely to communicate to representatives not of their race. This 
pattern, I argue, implies that politicians receive racially distorted communication, hearing much 
more frequently from constituents of their racial group than other racial groups. However, this 
bias in who legislators hear from does not disadvantage white Americans and minorities equally 
because most minorities are not represented by individuals of their race, although nearly all 
whites are. This phenomenon thus might explain the pattern that American minorities on the 
whole communicate to their representatives much less often than do whites, even though both 
groups appear to communicate to coracial representatives at similar rates. 
The field experiment revealed these consequences of politicians’ races for their 
constituents’ communication by exploiting unique electoral rules in Maryland, where several 
multi-member state legislative districts have both a black and a white Democratic representative. 
In the experiment, I offered 8,829 residents of such districts the purported opportunity to 
communicate to one of their actual representatives. However, crucially, I randomly assigned to 
which of their representatives I offered subjects an opportunity to communicate: some subjects 
were randomly assigned to have the opportunity to communicate to their representative of their 
race, while others instead had the opportunity to communicate to their representative of a 
different race. 
 The results show that both blacks and whites were considerably less likely to 
communicate to their representatives of a different race; indeed, more than a third of black 
subjects who opted to communicate to their black representative would not have communicated 
to their white representative. Suggesting that this gap has important consequences for political 
representation, these patterns suggest that a white politician who represents a majority black 
district might nonetheless receive double the amount of communication from their white 
constituents than from black constituents. Such stark racial distortions have clear consequences 
for political representation and reveal a heretofore-unappreciated reason why the presence of 
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minorities in political office is crucial to minorities’ equal substantive representation. Indeed, 
even politicians making every effort to provide equitable representation may nonetheless 
underrepresent those not of their race in part because of a racial skew present in the 
communication they receive. 
I also find that black and white subjects had essentially equal interest in communicating 
to representatives of their race. In stark contrast to the aggregate pattern that minorities are less 
likely to communicate to their representatives than are whites, blacks in the experiment were just 
as interested in communicating their views to representatives of their race as were whites. 
However, far fewer minorities have the opportunity to communicate to representatives of their 
race than do whites in the US writ large, suggesting that many minorities’ representation by 
whites in government may help explain the racial gap in constituent communication. If the 
political system as a whole is to hear the concerns of racial minorities in equal measure, more 
minorities may need to serve in office. 
 Finally, I show that subjects who live in segregated areas were the most reluctant to 
communicate to a representative of a different race. This pattern suggests additional guidance for 
politicians, policymakers, and political scientists about, respectively, when racial distortions in 
political communication might be largest, when descriptive representation has the greatest 
potential to ameliorate communicative inequalities, and potential mechanisms that should inspire 
future research. 
 In the next section I discuss the theoretical reasons to expect (and to doubt) individuals to 
be more likely to communicate to representatives of their race and the mixed findings and 
methodological challenges that have characterized extant scholarly efforts. 
 
Why Might Individuals Communicate More To Representatives Of Their Race? 
 The persistent racial gaps in citizens’ propensity to communicate to their representatives 
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clearly have important consequences for equal substantive representation (Bergan 2009), but 
what explains the racial communication gap is by no means obvious. The communication gap 
might be thought to reflect a more general pattern that minorities are less likely to participate in 
politics in a variety of ways. However, racial gaps in constituent communication are in fact far 
larger than for many other political activities. For example, whites and blacks have voted at 
fairly similar rates in recent Presidential elections, but blacks are about half as likely to contact 
their representatives. 
 This article argues that important racial gaps in constituent communication can be 
explained in part by a phenomenon whereby constituents are less likely to communicate to 
representatives not of their race. Even if all Americans were equally likely to communicate to 
legislators of their race, racial minorities might communicate far less often because they are 
significantly less likely to be represented by someone of their race than are whites. 
Why might we expect individuals to communicate more to representatives of their race? 
First, existing research suggests that trust between minorities and their representatives of their 
race may arise the “shared experience of subordination” and help facilitate dialogue (Mansbridge 
1999; see also Abney and Hutcheson 1981; Williams 1998; Grose 2011). Beyond trust for a 
particular representative, scholars have also argued that minorities feel more politically 
empowered when they have representatives of their race and are more likely to participate in 
politics as a consequence (e.g., Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; 
Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004). Relatedly, rational constituents might tend to eschew 
communication to outgroup representatives if they expect them to be less responsive to their 
concerns. Politicians’ campaign strategies might also induce a link between their races and their 
constituents’ communication if their campaigns lead coracial voters to be more likely to 
recognize their names or have positive affect towards them (e.g., Grose 2011, p. 30-33). Last, 
extensive psychological research suggests that people generally eschew interactions with an 
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outgroup (e.g., Allport 1954; Blascovich et al. 2001; Richeson and Trawalter 2005; Richeson and 
Shelton 2007), especially when they have rarely interacted with members of that outgroup before 
(Emerson, Kimbro, and Yancey 2002; Plant and Devine 2003; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; 
Boisjoly et al. 2006; Paluck and Green 2009; Gaither and Sommers 2013).2 For a number of 
reasons, Americans thus might expect to pay a greater psychic cost for (or expect to reap fewer 
benefits from) communicating to representatives who are not of their race. Gay (2002) and 
Hickey (2010) provide empirical evidence consistent with these expectations and find that blacks 
with black Congressional representatives are more likely to report having contacted their 
Congressperson in the past year. 
However, despite the persuasive reasons to expect individuals to communicate to 
representatives of their race, the empirical record for this conjecture is decidedly mixed. Many 
scholars have found no effects of descriptive representation on political communication (Haynes 
1997; Wong et al. 2011) and on other forms of participation (Broockman 2013a; Gay 2001; 
Gilliam 1996; Henderson et al. 2013; Keele and White 2011; Lawless 2004; Overby 2005; Tate 
2002). There is even some evidence that incorporation can sometimes decrease participation 
(Spence, McClerking, and Brown 2009). 
In addition to the conflicting empirical record, there are a number of theoretical reasons 
to doubt that individuals would be any more likely to communicate to representatives of their 
race. The most compelling is the perhaps banal observation that members of the public are 
typically ignorant about who represents them (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996); yet in order 
for individuals to act differently towards representatives who share their characteristics, it seems 
they must be aware of who their representatives are. In addition, people may expect it to be less 
worthwhile to communicate to their representative of a their race if they expect coracial 
                                                
2 There is also, of course, substantial evidence that intergroup contact can increase racial tensions (e.g., Key 1949; 
Enos 2013a, 2013b; Hersh and Nall 2013). 
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representatives to already agree with them. 
Enduring Methodological Challenges 
 Scholars investigating the link between race and constituent communication have met 
two main challenges that may account for this hypothesis’ mixed empirical record. 
The first challenge scholars have contended with is selection bias: minorities who are 
more likely to participate in politics may also be more likely to have minority representatives 
regardless, both because minorities who participate more in politics are more likely to 
successfully elect someone of their race and because minority politicians may draw themselves 
districts filled with disproportionately politically active minorities (Henderson et al. 2013). These 
patterns leave the direction of causality between mass political participation and elite minority 
representation difficult to assess with strictly observational approaches. 
 A second challenge researchers have faced is the necessity of relying on subjects’ self-
reports to measure whether they have politically communicated to their representatives. As 
political scientists have long appreciated, self-reports of political participation are prone to 
systematic bias (see Zaller 1996; Schaeffer and Presser 2003, p. 68-72 for review). Indeed, self-
reported participation might be particularly unreliable in this case. On the one hand, people may 
feel more politically engaged when they are represented by a member of their group (e.g., 
Williams 1998) even if this does not actually translate into actual behavior. On the other hand, 
social desirability might bias self-reported estimates toward zero when race is at issue. 
Systematic patterns in non-response might also bias survey-based estimates toward zero, 
especially when minorities are respondents. 
 In the next section I describe how I exploited unique electoral rules in Maryland to 
overcome these challenges. 
 
Experimental Design 
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Measuring Participation 
To measure subjects’ propensity to communicate to their representatives without relying 
on their self-reports of past behavior, the experiment presented individuals who were not aware 
they were being studied with a purported opportunity to communicate to one of their actual 
representatives and then measured whether they took this opportunity. Specifically, an automatic 
dialer called individuals on the phone at their homes and, when subjects picked up the phone, 
immediately played the recorded message shown in Box 1, “Hello. Would you like to tell 
Delegate [FIRST AND LAST NAME OF STATE REPRESENTATIVE] your opinion on a political 
issue?” (State house members in Maryland have the title “Delegate”, not “Representative.”)3 
Note that there was no other communication after subjects picked up the phone and 
before this message was played: subjects did not know they were being studied; only after 
playing the above message and recording the dependent variable were subjects informed that the 
call was a research survey being conducted by Yale4 University that would not be sent to their 
representative. 5 Note also that, as with how political actors typically ask people to communicate, 
                                                
3 One disadvantage of this script is that I did not specify on what issue subjects would ostensibly inform their 
legislator of their views. I chose to avoid mentioning a particular issue in order to ensure that any differences I found 
were not a result of the interaction between race and one particular issue or issue prime alone – if I had asked 
individuals to communicate about welfare, for example, one might wonder whether the effects would generalize to 
other issues. On the other hand, the strategy I did employ naturally raises questions about whether one would expect 
the effects to be weaker when subjects have more reason to speak up – to take an extreme case, if the Maryland 
Transportation Administration were planning to seize an individuals’ home, one might expect race to be less of a 
barrier for those seeking relief from their legislators. However, individuals rarely do have much reason to speak up 
in politics: they rarely expect to be pivotal when they politically participate as voters or as communicators. Even if 
the results are only generalizable to contexts when individuals do not have much direct reason to speak up, the 
results would thus still apply to nearly all political communication individuals engage in. In other words, one would 
expect that individuals who speak up rarely do so in such a purposive manner that the factors that deterred them 
from communicating in this situation would not also deter them in others. Nonetheless, future research should 
consider this hypothesis. 
4 This research was conducted when the author was a student at Yale University. The Yale University Human 
Subjects Committee reviewed and granted an exemption for this research. 
5 See Box SI1 in the Supporting Information for the text of the rest of the call after the dependent variable was 
recorded. As is shown in Box SI1, for those who signaled willingness to participate, the call concluded by 
conducting an actual short survey about crime (after the dependent variable was already recorded). I conducted this 
follow-up survey at the advice of the Human Subjects Committee in order to minimize the deception associated with 
the experiment; the call initially claimed to be administering a survey on a political issue, and so did administer one 
lest subjects would feel excessively deceived. As with any experiment on human subjects, ethics were also an 
important consideration in other ways. First, note that I did seek and receive an exemption from the Human Subjects 
Committee for this study. Second, I sought to minimize harm to subjects by informing them of the deception as soon 
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the call did not mention representatives’ races to subjects, only their representatives’ name.6 
Box 1. Automated Message in Phone Call 
When person first picks up the phone: 
“Hello. Would you like to tell Delegate [RANDOMIZED NAME OF ONE OF SUBJECT’S 
STATE REPRESENTATIVES] your opinion on a political issue? Press 1 if you would 
participate. Press 2 if you would not participate.” Dependent variable recorded. 
 
The dependent variable for all analyses is whether subjects opted to communicate to their 
representative. Subjects were coded as such if they dialed the numeral 1. In accordance with the 
script, doing so indicated that they wished to communicate to the legislator to which they had 
been randomly assigned. All other subjects – including both those who pressed 2 (explicitly 
declining to communicate) and those who simply hang up after hearing the name of the legislator 
they were assigned – were coded as having declined to participate. 
In summary, I measured whether subjects would communicate to one of their legislators 
by ostensibly presenting them with this very opportunity and then measuring whether they chose 
to do so. 
Overcoming Selection: Multi-Member Districts 
The design also overcame the potential for selection bias, which might lead individuals 
who politically participate more to be more likely to have coracial representatives even if having 
a coracial representative did not facilitate communication in turn. The experiment did so by 
exploiting a unique electoral rule: Maryland’s multi-member state legislative districts. I 
conducted the experiment in six districts where a black and a white Democratic legislator both 
served (as of April 2011). Crucially, I could thus fully randomize the race of the representatives 
                                                                                                                                                       
as possible: I made the first sentence of the call as short as possible so that most subjects likely heard the disclaimer 
within about fifteen seconds of picking up the call and so the call took as little of subject’s time as possible. As 
discussed, deception was necessary because previous research indicates that survey self-reports may be unreliable. I 
also sought to make the call as short as possible so as to represent a minimum imposition on subjects’ time. Last, I 
chose the sample size to be as small as possible while still being able to detect effects so as to limit the number of 
subjects whose time I took. In these ways I sought to minimize any harm that might come to subjects as a result of 
participating in the study. Future work that takes a similar approach should keep these concerns in mind in designing 
experimental interventions. 
6 Any treatment effects are thus likely understated to the extent that subjects did not know their legislators’ races. 
The effects among those subjects who do know are potentially far greater than the average effects for all subjects 
that I report. 
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to whom I gave subjects the opportunity to communicate; all subjects had representatives of both 
races and were thus eligible for random assignment to treatments where they either had the 
opportunity to communicate to their representative of their race or to their representative not of 
their race. 
The districts used in the experiment were Maryland State House Districts 13, 18, 26, 28, 
41, and 43, shown on a map in Figure SI1 in the Supporting Information – they are located 
throughout where the bulk of Maryland’s population is located. In each district I always 
constructed the scripts with the names of the two Democratic legislators of different races who 
had served the most similar amount of time in the legislature.7 
Data and Randomization Procedure 
 I purchased the subjects’ phone numbers and background information from TargetSmart 
Communications, a well-known and reputable political data firm. TargetSmart provided a sample 
of people in each of these districts who had landline phone numbers (because calling cell phones 
is questionably legal). TargetSmart8 provided approximately 30,000 phone numbers, or 
approximately 2,250 white phone numbers and 2,750 black numbers9 in each of the six districts. 
 I assigned subjects to treatment groups with block randomization by district, race, zip 
                                                
7 The legislators I used are available upon request and in the replication data. 
8 TargetSmart is one of the leading political data firms, similar to Catalist (see Ansolabehere and Hersh 2012). To 
estimate respondent’s races, TargetSmart uses an ensemble of predictions from two models from third-party 
industry-leading commercial racial classification data firms as well as its own algorithm as a supplement. These 
models rely upon rich individual-level data including not only individuals’ names and geographic contexts but also 
detailed individual-level data like home ownership records, consumer behavior purchased from third parties (e.g., 
credit card companies), and a variety of other sources. These data thus come from the same state-of-the-art and 
industry-standard models relied upon by non-political commercial firms of all kinds. Hersh (2013) analyzes the 
validity of Catalist’s very similar model (both rely on much of the same underlying data) by matching respondents 
to their CCES responses and finds that it correctly identifies between 91% and 96% of voters’ races (even in racially 
heterogeneous areas like the districts I analyze). Note that any inaccuracies in the model are very likely to lead the 
experiment to underestimate the true treatment effect – to the extent that the data suggests that some white voters are 
black, for example, this measurement error will only bias the estimates toward zero and lead me to underestimate the 
effect of the same-race legislator treatment among blacks. Even at the lower bound of Hersh (2013)’s validation, in 
order to spuriously generate the effects I find an unobservable characteristic would need to be present in only a very 
small share of the population (those misclassified) and be nearly perfectly correlated both with being racially 
misclassified and with interest in communicating to representatives. 
9 I ordered more black phone numbers because I expected overall black response rates to be lower and thus 
statistical power to be lower. 
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code, party affiliation, whether the subject was over 50 years of age, and whether the subject had 
voted in the 2008 general election. This procedure retained the equal likelihood that each 
observation would be assigned to each treatment group while balancing the number of 
observations in each category that would be assigned to each group (Gerber and Green 2012). A 
randomization check indicated that balance on covariates remained among those successfully 
contacted (see Table SI2 in the Supporting Information). 
I reached participants by phone using a robotic dialer administered by Impact Dialing and 
played the script discussed previously and that appeared in Box 1. The dialer called the treatment 
and control groups at the same time and pace in a fully randomized order so that the groups 
remained comparable.10 The dialer also recorded whether the call was picked up by a person (and 
not voicemail) and subjects’ input on the keypad during the call. Phone numbers that were not 
picked up the first time were attempted twice more by the same procedure on subsequent days.11 
Excluded Subjects 
For the analyses I excluded all subjects who either never picked up the phone or who 
hung up the phone within 4 seconds of picking it up. The treatment was never administered to 
these subjects because they never heard the name of the legislator to which they had been 
randomly assigned, either because they never picked up the phone in the first place or because 
they hung up before the name was read. This left 8,829 subjects who were played the name of 
their legislator and thus ‘treated’, 4,774 black subjects and 4,055 white subjects. (The results 
remain the same when all observations are included; none of the excluded subjects had the 
opportunity to communicate in the first place and they attrited equally from both treatment 
groups.) 
 
                                                
10 The data sent to the dialer company also did not contain information on the race of the subjects (and therefore 
treatment assignment to the same race condition could not be recovered with this data). 
11 The decision to call back no-answer households a second and third time was made ex ante and without knowledge 
of the intermediate results. 
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Results 
Constituents Communicate Less To Representatives Not Of Their Race 
 Overall, 6.3% of whites and 5.0% of blacks who had the opportunity to communicate to 
one of their representatives opted for this opportunity. These overall rates of communication are 
expectedly low in absolute terms: they mirror the fact that, in reality, very few people do take the 
time to communicate to their representatives. Indeed, these rates are nearly identical to what 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) report for how likely citizens are to contact state elected 
officials (p. 72). 
 However, race greatly impacted whether individuals opted to communicate to their 
legislators: subjects’ rates of communication greatly differed depending on whether they were 
randomly assigned to have the opportunity to communicate to a legislator of their race. 
Specifically, subjects were 1.8 percentage points more likely to agree to communicate to their 
legislator of their race (p < .001, all tests two-tailed): 4.7% of subjects opted to communicate to a 
legislator of a different race, while 6.5% communicated to a legislator of their race. Column 1 of 
Table 1 presents this result. Because so few people do communicate to their representatives, 
these small percentage point differences have large aggregate effects on who politicians are 
likely to hear from. Indeed, the experimental counterfactual implies that around one in four of 
the subjects who opted to communicate to their legislator of their race would not have done so 
had they had the opportunity to communicate to their legislator not of their race. 
Figure 1. Proportion of Subjects Opting To Communicate To Representatives, By Subject 
Race and Legislator Race 
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Results by Subjects’ Race 
 
 These differences are particularly striking for black subjects. As shown in the right half 
of Figure 1 and in Column 2 of Table 1, blacks communicated to their white legislator only 3.9 
percent of the time, yet were a full 2.1 percentage points more likely to do so when they had the 
opportunity to communicate to their black representative (p <  .001), a greater than 50% increase 
in communication. Put differently, the experimental counterfactual implies that more than a third 
of the blacks who opted to communicate to their black representative would not have done so 
had they had the opportunity to communicate to their white representative instead. 
Table 1. Treatment Effects of Legislators’ Race on Constituents’ Communication (OLS) 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Race of Subjects All Blacks Blacks Blacks Whites Whites Whites 
Experimental 
Treatment Effect 
       
Legislator Same 
Race as Subject 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
0.022*** 
(0.006) 
0.022*** 
(0.006) 
0.014^ 
(0.008) 
0.013^ 
(0.008) 
0.014^ 
(0.008) 
Covariates        
Democratic Party 
Affiliation 
- - -0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
- -0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
Voted in 2010 
Primary 
- - 0.027** 
(0.010) 
0.027** 
(0.010) 
- 0.033** 
(0.011) 
0.033** 
(0.011) 
Voted in 2010 
General 
- - 0.022** 
(0.008) 
0.021** 
(0.008) 
- 0.016^ 
(0.009) 
0.016^ 
(0.009) 
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Area % Urban - - 0.020 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.017) 
- 0.013 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.014) 
Area % Black - - 0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.035 
(0.022) 
- -0.012 
(0.018) 
-0.013 
(0.025) 
Area Black Med. 
HH Inc. ($10,000s) 
- - 0.002^ 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
- - - 
Area White Med. 
HH Inc. ($10,000s) 
- - - - - -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Leg. District Fixed 
Effects 
- - - Yes - - Yes 
Constant 0.047*** 
(0.003) 
0.039*** 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.017) 
- 0.056*** 
(0.005) 
0.032* 
(0.016) 
- 
R2 .001 .002 .010 .013 .001 .008 .009 
N 8829 4774 4752 4752 4055 4025 4025 
Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions is whether the subject opted to communicate to 
their legislator. ^=p<.10, *=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001, two-tailed tests. Robust standard 
errors. 
 
Whites were also more likely to communicate to their white representative: as Figure 1 
and Column 5 of Table 1 show, whites were 1.4 percentage points less likely to communicate to 
a black representative (p = .06). In the context of the 7% of whites who communicate to their 
white representative, this represents a decrease of about 20%. Put differently, about one in five 
whites who opted to communicate to their white representative would not have done so had they 
been presented with the opportunity to communicate to their black representative instead. 
Robustness of Main Results. To demonstrate the statistical robustness of the results, I first 
add covariates to the regression specifications in Table 1. Columns 3 and 6 present the results 
with dummy variables for whether subjects voted in the 2010 primary and general elections, and 
the income, racial, and urban composition of the respondents’ census block groups. Columns 4 
and 7 introduce district-level fixed effects. As expected given the randomization, the 
experimental results remain essentially unchanged in the presence of these covariates. 
 It may be of concern that the models specify the experiment as having 8,829 
observations, whereas I actually analyze variation on the level of legislators, of which there were 
only 12 (two in each of the six districts I used). To account for this legislator-level and district-
level uncertainty, I therefore also ran the analyses with standard errors clustered at the district 
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and the politician levels and with legislator-level and district-level random effects. Reassuringly, 
the main results hold and are statistically significant at the same levels under both of these 
alternative specifications.12 
In summary, the experimental results are highly consistent: both blacks and whites are 
markedly less willing to communicate to their representatives of a different race than to their 
representatives of their race. 
Blacks and Whites Communicate Similarly Often To Same-Race Representatives 
 It has long been observed that blacks are less likely to communicate to their political 
representatives than are whites (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, p. 233). However, if 
individuals are less likely to communicate to representatives not of their race, could the fact that 
most racial minorities are represented by whites help explain this racial gap in constituent 
communication? 
Table 2. Predictors of Communication To White and Descriptive Representatives (OLS) 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Race of Legislator To Whom 
Subjects Had Opportunity To 
Communicate 
White 
Legislator  
Same Race 
Legislator  
Same Race 
Legislator  
Same Race 
Legislator  
Black Subject -0.031*** 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
Democratic Party Affiliation - - -0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
Voted in 2010 Primary - - 0.036*** 
(0.011) 
0.036*** 
(0.011) 
Voted in 2010 General - - 0.023* 
(0.009) 
0.022* 
(0.009) 
Area % Urban - - 0.029* 
(0.012) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
Area % Black - - 0.019 
(0.014) 
-0.006 
(0.020) 
Med. HH Income of Those of 
Subjects’ Race ($10,000s) 
- - 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Leg. District Fixed Effects - - - Yes 
Constant 0.070*** 
(0.006) 
0.070*** 
(0.006) 
0.009** 
(0.016) 
- 
                                                
12 The results are also identical when employing probit and logistic regression instead of a linear probability model, 
although best practices in randomized controlled trials do not involve the use of logistic regression (Freedman 2008). 
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R2 .005 .000 .010 .013 
N 4328 4438 4410 4410 
Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions is whether the subject opted to communicate to 
their legislator. *=p<.10, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001, two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors. 
 
To consider this hypothesis, I first compute the racial difference in communication to 
white representatives in the first column of Table 2 (the same difference can be calculated by 
comparing the first and third columns in Figure 2). This comparison between how likely black 
and white subjects were to communicate to white legislators replicates patterns that prevail for 
most blacks and whites in the United States since most have white representatives: only 33% of 
blacks have representatives of their race in the US House, though a full 92% of whites do; and no 
blacks have black representatives in the US Senate (as of 2012) whereas over 99% of whites do. 
Significantly, this comparison shows that blacks are almost half as likely as whites to 
communicate to white representatives (p < .001). 
However, strikingly, this long-noted substantial black-white communication gap 
essentially disappears among the respondents who had the opportunity to communicate to a 
legislator of their race. The second column of Table 2 estimates the difference in the probability 
that those of each race communicated to their legislator of their own race (equivalently reached 
by comparing the leftmost and rightmost columns in Figure 1). Notably, the difference between 
black and white subjects’ rates of communication to representatives of their race is statistically 
insignificant and less than a third of the similar estimate for communication to white 
representatives. The final two columns add controls to this comparison identical to those used in 
Table 1; this null finding is robust. 
Recall the patterns discussed at the beginning of the article: racial minorities in the 
United States are about half as likely to communicate to their political representatives as are 
whites. The experimental results suggest that minorities’ general lack of access to representatives 
of their race can help explain much of this gap. Blacks and whites in the experiment were 
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essentially just as interested in communicating to representatives of their race;13 likewise, blacks 
and whites were both markedly less likely to communicate to representatives not of their race. 
Because minorities are much less likely to have descriptive representatives than are whites, 
however, this generates a systematic skew in who communicates to their elected representatives 
in the US; reflecting this pattern, communication to white representatives in the experiment 
mirrored the country’s large racial gap in communication. 
Constituents In Segregated Areas Communicate To Outgroup Representatives Least 
 Is one’s representative’s race always equally relevant to whether individuals 
communicate, or is it more influential for individuals in certain circumstances? There are several 
reasons to expect individuals who live in particularly black neighborhoods to be the most 
reluctant to communicate to representatives not of their race. Most of all, a rich tradition in 
psychology suggests that those who have experienced little intergroup contact in the past will 
tend to eschew social contact with outgroups as a result: those who have interacted with 
members of an outgroup on a regular basis typically show little aversion to doing so, although 
people with less prior experience interacting with outgroups in the past typically eschew such 
interactions (Emerson, Kimbro, and Yancey 2002; Gaither and Sommers 2013; Plant and Devine 
2003; see also Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Paluck and Green 2009). Decades of 
sociological research also suggests that individuals who live in particularly black neighborhoods 
are also the least likely to have intergroup contact: very black neighborhoods tend to be highly 
socially segregated, with both blacks and whites living in them interacting very infrequently 
(e.g., Blalock 1967; Blau 1977; Sigelman et al. 1996).14 We would expect this to be particularly 
true for blacks in very black neighborhoods; in nearly all-black neighborhoods, blacks are likely 
                                                
13 Although the generalizability of this result to other contexts is necessarily a matter of conjecture, racial gaps in 
access to other resources are similar in these districts as elsewhere in the country: blacks’ median yearly household 
incomes in these areas are nearly $7,000 lower on average than whites’. 
14 A related literature in political science has similarly uncovered significant impacts of segregation and group 
contact on political participation and views (e.g., Cohen and Dawson 1993; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Oliver 
and Mendelberg 2000; Enos 2013a, 2013b). 
 18 
to have few white neighbors at all. Black subjects in the experiment who live in segregated 
neighborhoods might also tend to have less trust in white representatives as a result of being 
continually subject to residential segregation (Williams 1998). 
To test the possibility that subjects who live in black neighborhoods are especially 
unwilling to communicate to representatives of a different race, I matched subjects to data on the 
racial composition of their neighborhoods at the census block group level, the smallest level of 
aggregation available from the US Census and which corresponds roughly to small 
neighborhoods (the median subject’s block group had a total population of 1,136, while the 
8,829 subjects were spread across 536 different block groups). I then examined the interaction 
between the experimental treatment effect and the racial composition of subjects’ neighborhoods. 
Figure 2. Overall Treatment Effect Heterogeneity by Black Percentage of Neighborhood 
 
Notes: The Figure shows a local polynomial estimate of the likelihood that subjects in each 
treatment group communicated to their legislators across neighborhoods with varying degrees of 
segregation. 
 
Figure 2 displays a local polynomial estimate of the percentage of respondents opting to 
communicate to their legislator in each of the treatment groups by the percentage of their 
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neighborhood that is black. 95% confidence intervals surround each estimate.15 Table 3 examines 
this hypothesis formally. 
The Figure and Column 1 of Table 3 strongly support the hypothesis that representatives’ 
races are a much greater determinant of communication in neighborhoods with high black 
populations, with living in the blackest neighborhoods associated with a more than doubling of 
political communication to same-race representatives. Column 2 attempts to evaluate competing 
explanations for this pattern by adding additional interaction terms for political 
activity/awareness (as measured by whether the subjected voted in the 2010 primary election) 
and the median household income of blacks in subjects’ in Census block groups, factors that 
might be thought to correlate with neighborhood racial makeup and be responsible for the 
results. I also introduce a number of covariates to control for factors such as whether subjects 
voted in the 2010 general election, their party affiliation, district-level fixed effects. The 
significance of the main heterogeneous effect remains strong, indicating that those in segregated 
areas do appear to be systematically less communicative to legislators not of their race for 
reasons not easily explicable by differences in income or political activity. 
Table 3. Subjects In Segregated Areas Least Willing To Communicate To Outgroup 
Representatives 
Specification (All OLS) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Race of Subjects All All Blacks 
Only 
Blacks 
Only 
Whites 
Only 
Whites 
Only 
Experimental Treatment Effect       
Legislator Same Race as Subject 0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.013) 
-0.002 -0.018 
(0.020) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.018) 
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects       
Leg Same Race X 
Neighborhood % Black 
0.032* 
(0.015) 
0.037* 
(0.015) 
0.041* 
(0.020) 
0.047* 
(0.021) 
0.030 
(0.033) 
0.025 
(0.034) 
Leg Same Race X Voted in 2010 
Primary 
- 0.017 
(0.013) 
- 0.030^ 
(0.017) 
- 0.001 
(0.020) 
Leg Same Race X Neighborhood 
Black Median HH Income 
($10,000s) 
- 0.002 
(0.002) 
- 0.001 
(0.003) 
- 0.002 
(0.002) 
Covariates       
                                                
15 To estimate these functions and their confidence intervals I used the local polynomial regression command in 
STATA 10 (twoway lpolyci), employing the software-generated default bandwidths (0.14 for the treatment group 
values and 0.18 for the control group values), the default kernel setting (epanechnikov), and the default confidence 
intervals (by default calculated using pilot bandwidths 1.5 times the size of the bandwidths for the fitted values). 
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Neighborhood % Black -0.032*** 
(0.009) 
-0.042*** 
(0.012) 
-0.022^ 
(0.012) 
-0.059* 
(0.023) 
-0.032^ 
(0.018) 
-0.024 
(0.026) 
Voted in 2010 General - 0.018** 
(0.006) 
- 0.022** 
(0.008) 
- 0.014 
(0.009) 
Voted in 2010 Primary - 0.022* 
(0.009) 
- 0.013 
(0.011) 
- 0.033* 
(0.015) 
Democratic Party Affiliation - -0.006 
(0.006) 
- -0.011 
(0.007) 
- 0.001 
(0.009) 
Neighborhood Black Median HH 
Income ($10,000s) 
- 0.001 
(0.001) 
- 0.001 
(0.002) 
- 0.001 
(0.002) 
Neighborhood % Urban - 0.008 
(0.011) 
- 0.017 
(0017) 
- 0.005 
(0.015) 
Leg. District Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.059*** 
(0.005) 
- 0.052*** 
(0.009) 
- 0.062*** 
(0.007) 
- 
R2 0.002 0.012 0.003 0.015 0.001 0.010 
N 8819 8476 4767 4752 4052 3724 
Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions is whether the subject opted to communicate to 
their legislator. ^=p<.10, *=p<.05, **=p<.01, two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors. Ns 
change slightly between regressions because all Census variables are not available for all 
subjects. 
 
The remainder of Table 3 breaks down the results by the subjects’ race. Considering 
black subjects only, the heterogeneity remains similarly large and statistically significant. A 
linear estimate of the effects is presented in Column 3 of Table 3 and finds that in neighborhoods 
that are nearly all black descriptive representation nearly doubles communication (interaction 
significant at p < .05): blacks in such areas opted to communicate to their white representative 
only about 3% of the time but to their black representative 6.9% of the time. 16 Column 4 shows 
that these results are consistent with the addition of controls. 
The pattern for whites alone is less clear in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3. This may be 
because the theoretical case for expecting the same heterogeneity is less strong for whites (who 
may interact with many blacks when they live in very black neighborhoods), although the 
relative paucity of data and weaker baseline effect for whites may also be responsible.  
 These results have two primary implications. First, the descriptive finding that the 
treatment effects are larger in blacker neighborhoods has immediate substantive implications for 
                                                
16 The borderline significant heterogeneous treatment effect for the coefficient on “Legislator Same Race X Subject 
Voted in 2010 Primary” among blacks has multiple potential interpretations; one potential explanation is that these 
subjects were more politically knowledgeable and thus more likely to know that the legislators were of the 
same/different races. Sampling variability could also be responsible. 
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politicians and policymakers: politicians who receive racially distorted communication from 
their constituencies may want to take particular care to encourage communication from those 
living in such areas, whereas policymakers drawing majority-minority districts might also 
consider taking into account the especially strong preference for descriptive representation that 
those who live in segregated areas appear to have. 
The results also provide suggestive evidence for the mechanism responsible for the main 
effects. Although this evidence alone cannot firmly establish any particular account (Bullock et 
al. 2010), the results are consistent with a hypothesis drawn from the rich literature in 
psychology on intergroup contact: that subjects who rarely interact with other individuals not of 
their race will be more likely to avoid such cross-racial contact. These patterns have the same 
broader social consequences regardless of the mechanisms underlying them, but suggest a 
potentially promising line of inquiry for future research. 
External Validity 
 One may well wonder how the results obtained from one experiment in Maryland’s 
multi-member state legislative districts might apply to other circumstances. For readers 
interested in considering these questions, the Supporting Information evaluates a number of ways 
in which Maryland, these districts, these politicians, and this approach might differ from their 
analogues elsewhere and what possible implications these differences might have. Along a 
variety of such dimensions, I discuss why it is unlikely that circumstances unique to Maryland’s 
legislature or these legislators account for the results: these legislators’ names are not particularly 
more or less indicative of their races than other American legislators’, these legislators’ 
ideological positions are largely similar to each other, Maryland is not atypical when it comes to 
race relations, and the role of party differences (not present in these analyses as all the legislators 
were Democrats) would only seem to exacerbate these effects elsewhere. Likewise, for more 
well-known politicians like Members of Congress one might expect the effects to be even larger; 
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any ignorance about state legislators’ races would only move this experiment’s estimates closer 
to zero. 
 
Discussion: Distorted Communication, Unequal Representation 
Politicians better represent the constituents who contact them (e.g., Miller and Stokes 
1963; Fenno 1977; Kingdon 1989, p. 54-60; Kollman 1998). Although representatives typically 
attempt to act in accordance with their constituents’ wishes, in their natural state they often know 
surprisingly little about what their constituents prefer (Broockman and Skovron 2013; Butler and 
Nickerson 2011). As field experiments have accordingly confirmed (Bergan 2009; Bergan and 
Cole 2013), politicians thus crucially rely on constituent communication as they make policy 
decisions (see also Miler 2010, ch. 5; Congressional Management Foundation 2011). As Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady (1995, p. 463) thus write, “it matters for politics what and from whom 
public officials hear.” 
However, politicians are not equally likely to hear from all their constituents: racial 
minorities in the United States are significantly less likely to contact their representatives than 
are whites. These racial gaps in constituent communication have clear consequences for political 
equality,17 yet despite much progress in understanding why individuals participate in politics and 
shrinking racial gaps in voter turnout (e.g., Aldrich 1993; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; 
Gerber and Green 2000), large racial gaps in constituent communication have yet to be 
explained. 
This article presented a field experiment exploring the role of politicians’ races in the 
racial constituent communication gap by measuring whether 8,829 people took an opportunity to 
communicate to one of their actual representatives. Crucially, the race of the representative to 
                                                
17 On this point, it is implausible that representatives could merely ‘reweight’ the communication they receive in 
order to understand what their constituents would say were these distortions not present: most constituents do not 
supply their race when they communicate to their legislators, and there is, as discussed, ample evidence that the 
communication legislators receive greatly impacts their policy decisions. 
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which subjects had the opportunity to communicate was randomized, an opportunity afforded by 
their residence in multi-member districts in Maryland that both black and white legislators 
represent. The results of this field experiment uncovered patterns that help address significant 
puzzles about the biased substantive representation of racial minorities in American politics. 
First, the experiment demonstrates that blacks and whites are both significantly less likely 
to communicate to political representatives of a different race. Moreover, these differences are 
substantively large: the experimental counterfactual implies that more than a third of the blacks 
in the experiment who asked to communicate to their black representative would not have 
communicated to their white representative. 
These patterns matter because, as Fenno (1977, p. 883) noted, “the constituency that a 
representative reacts to is the constituency that he or she sees.” The experiment suggests that 
legislators ‘react’ to racially distorted views of their constituencies: because blacks and whites 
are both less likely to communicate to representatives of a different race, politicians will tend to 
hear disproportionately frequently from individuals of their race and disproportionately 
infrequently from those unlike them.18 
Figure 3 helps illustrate the problem these patterns create for minorities’ substantive 
political representation by demonstrating what would have occurred if the experiment had 
actually been an effort by legislators themselves or an interest group to inform legislators of their 
constituents’ opinions (as subjects were initially led to believe). The Figure calculates what 
percentage of the respondents to the ‘surveys’ I ostensibly conducted would have been white and 
black in a hypothetical district that is exactly half white and half black. Deviations from a 50/50 
split in the presence of black and white respondents in the resulting ‘sample’ thus indicate how 
distorted legislators’ perceptions of their constituents would have been: for example, if whites 
                                                
18 Consistent with this expectation, Grose (2011, p. 128) relates anecdotal evidence that some black Congresspeople 
claim to receive disproportionately more communication from their black constituents than their white constituents. 
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were twice as likely to communicate to their representatives as blacks, whites would be 
responsible for fully two-thirds of the communication their legislators received in a half-black 
district. (These results would certainly vary from context to context and are not meant to 
precisely estimate what occurs elsewhere. They simply help illustrate the substantive 
implications of the results.) 
Figure 3. Percentage of Communication From Constituents of Each Race Received by 
Legislators in Hypothetical Half-Black/Half-White District 
 
Notes: The Figure calculates what percentage of the communication representatives would have 
received from each racial group if they represented half-black, half-white districts, given the 
treatment effects in the experiment. 
 
The first row of Figure 3 displays estimates derived from the overall results, and the 
second row is based on the patterns observed in black neighborhoods (where the effects of 
legislators’ races were particularly acute). These calculations show that the experimental 
subjects’ white representatives would have heard from blacks about half as frequently as from 
whites even in a district that nonetheless was actually equal parts white and black. Similarly, 
black legislators in segregated areas would have heard from blacks nearly double as often as 
from whites. Although the experimental treatment effects are small in percentage point terms 
(reflecting the fact that, in the real world, a small share of people actually do communicate to 
their representatives), they imply quite large distortions in the communication politicians receive 
Contacts Received Black 
Constituents
White 
Constituents
Black Rep. (Overall)
White Rep. (Overall)
Black Rep. (Segregated)
White Rep. (Segregated)
Descriptive Rep. (Overall)
Descriptive Rep. 
(Segregated)
Congress (Overall)
Congress (Segregated)
52% 48%
36% 64%
69% 31%
30% 70%
46% 54%
50% 50%
40.10% 59.90%
39.17% 60.83%
48% 52%
 
Black Constituents White Constituents
64%
36%
 
31%
69%
 
70%
30%
 
54% 46%
 
50% 50%
 
Black Representatives White Representatives Descriptive Representatives
Overall
Black 
Neighborhoods
60%
40%
 
61%
39%
 
United States (Avg.)
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from their constituencies. 
One might hope that these biases cut equally across races in the United States, but racial 
minorities are significantly less likely to be represented by a person of their race: while only 33% 
of blacks have representatives of their race in the US House, a full 92% of whites do; no blacks 
have representatives of their race in the US Senate (as of 2012) whereas over 99% of whites do; 
and, likewise, only 38% of blacks have representatives of their race in their state houses while 
92% of whites do. Elected representatives thus appear to hear from minorities significantly less 
often than from whites because while most whites have the opportunity to communicate to a 
representative of their race, most racial minorities do not. Indeed, as illustrated in the third 
column of Figure 3, the results of the experiment imply that blacks’ relative lack of racial 
descriptive representation causes elected officials in the United States as a whole to hear from 
their blacks almost half as much as they hear from white constituents relative to what they 
should. 
While the results cannot directly speak to other groups, one should note that even fewer 
Latinos and Asian Americans have representatives of their race at the federal and state levels 
than do blacks. The distorting effects documented here may mute these groups’ voices to an even 
greater degree. 
This systematic bias muting the voices of minorities relative to whites suggests a new 
perspective on the important puzzle of why racial minorities receive significantly less substantive 
political representation in the United States (e.g., Griffin and Newman 2008). Outright racial 
favoritism among politicians themselves is no doubt real (e.g., Broockman 2013b; Butler and 
Broockman 2011) as are the many institutional barriers minorities face (e.g., Frymer 1999; 
Hajnal 2009). However, these findings suggest an additional mechanism for the 
underrepresentation of minorities in American politics that has yet to be appreciated: even 
completely unbiased politicians might represent their constituents in a racially biased manner due 
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to significant distortions in the racial backgrounds of those who communicate to them. 
There is a silver lining to these pessimistic results. Blacks in the experiment were 
essentially just as interested in communicating to their representatives of their race as were 
whites; the long-observed pattern that minorities are markedly less likely to contact their 
representatives in the US appears due in significant part to the fact that minorities are much less 
likely to have representatives of their race than are whites. As the final column in Figure 3 
illustrates, it thus appears that the substantial racial skew in who exercises political voice could 
significantly diminish if all Americans had access to political representatives of their race. As 
debates over the future of the Voting Rights Act continue, such evidence can play an important 
role in guiding the debate over the importance of drawing majority-minority districts (Henderson 
et al. 2013). 
Insofar as it is inevitable that some US politicians will represent substantial numbers of 
people not of their race, the results may also help policymakers and politicians understand where 
communicative inequalities might most prevail without descriptive representation: additional 
analyses showed that those living in segregated areas are the most reluctant to communicate to 
their outgroup representatives. Politicians may thus particularly wish to hire staff members of 
different races in district offices in segregated areas insofar as some constituents appear more 
comfortable communicating with those of their race, for example (see relatedly Grose, Mangum, 
and Martin 2007). 
As future research seeks to better understand this phenomenon, these results also suggest 
several theoretical questions ripe for further inquiry. First, although these results alone cannot 
definitively isolate the mechanisms responsible for individuals’ reluctance to communicate to 
representatives of different races, they do cast doubt on the sufficiency of most extant theories. 
First, most accounts based on trust posit that increased communication should occur primarily 
among groups who have experienced subordination (e.g., Mansbridge 1999); however, I found 
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substantial effects among whites as well. In addition, although the experiment could not evaluate 
the role played by generalized empowerment since all subjects had representatives of both races, 
the effects it did uncover cannot be attributed to general empowerment for the same reason. 
Fixed effects for Census block group also had little effect on the results, casting doubt on the 
hypothesis that selective campaigning is responsible; blacks and whites within the same 
neighborhoods still favor representatives of their own race. The heterogeneous treatment effects 
by neighborhood racial composition are suggestive of a mechanism that links subjects’ reactions 
to their representatives to more general patterns in willingness to engage in cross-racial contact, 
and future research could benefit from interventions able to isolate this theory. The patterns this 
article has uncovered have significant social consequences regardless of the mechanisms 
underlying them, but understanding their roots is a question ripe for further research. 
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